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A Comparative Analysis of Women's Issues: 
Toward a Contextualized Methodology 
Antoinette Sedillo LOpez * 
[T]he very notion that there exists a prototypical woman who can 
be described in ways that reflect and have meaning for the lives of 
the many different women living in very different geographical, 
economic, political and social settings needs to be challenged. 
- Ruth Hubbard 
Women's Nature: Rationalizations of Inequality (1983)1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite a global feminist movement,2 feminists have not developed a 
clearly articulated methodology of comparative analysis. 3 Comparative 
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank 
Professor Patricia Begne, University of Guanajuato, Guanajuato, Mexico, for the 
conversations about Mexican law. I appreciate Dean Robert Desiderio's summer research 
grant support of this Article. I also appreciate the work of the Hastings Women's Law 
Journal Staff and especially the work of Kavitha Sreeharsha, lead editor. 
1. Ruth Hubbard, Social Effects of Some Contemporary Myths about Women, in 
WOMAN'S NATURE: RATIONALIZATIONS OF INEQUALITY (Marian Lowe & Ruth Hubbard 
eds., 1983). 
2. American University hosted a conference for Latin American female lawyers, judges 
and academics in November, 1997, titled Panamerican Conference, Transforming Women's 
Legal Status, American University Washington College of the Law. I appreciate the 
conversations I had with the participants. Their insights inform this work. 
3. See The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDA W), Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 341180 (entry into force Sept. 3, 1981). 
CEDA W has been identified as a source of support for combating discrimination and 
pushing a women's rights agenda. See, e.g., Sherry Teachnor, The U.N. Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: An Effective Tool to Combat 
Discrimination in the 20th Century, 9 WHITTIER L. REv. 419 (1987). The U.N. CEDAW is 
a very important document in the area of women's rights. However, the declaration does not 
articulate a methodology for drawing comparisons between different international 
approaches to women's rights. It provides definitions of equality, a description of 
discriminatory practices and a mechanism for international supervision of the obligations 
the document imposes on nations that have ratified it. The United States has not yet ratified 
the Convention. See also Catherine Harries, Daughters of Our Peoples: International 
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analysis shows how problems faced in one jurisdiction are addressed in 
another. Comparing women's rights can provide important cultural 
insights into how women's issues have been addressed. However, a 
difficult issue comparativists face is a tendency to be ethnocentric when 
studying another nation's legal system.4 
This Article proposes a methodology for comparative analysis of 
women's rights using insights from critical race theory and feminism. 
Comparative analysis by a Western scholar must reconcile a perspective 
developed in the United States with respect for another culture. In 
discussing women's rights, lawyers, judges, students and sociologists have 
justified certain women's situations as an inherent aspect of culture. For 
example, traditional "female genital surgery" has been defended as a "mere 
bodily mutilation" that is the "sine qua non of the whole teaching of tribal 
law, religion, and morality.,,5 In Mexico, "machismo" has been justified as 
an immutable characteristic of Mexican culture that should be respected.6 
Cultural relativists maintain that criticizing cultural norms is akin to 
advocating cultural genocide.7 Thus, comparative analysis faces the 
challenge of respecting cultural differences. 
Feminists in the United States also confront the issue of respect for 
diversity and respect for other cultures. 8 Although white middle-class 
feminists have dominated the feminist movement in the United States, 
feminists of color have criticized white feminist domination for ignoring 
their needs and perspectives.9 Similarly, the international feminist 
Feminism Meets Ugandan Law and Custom, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 493 (1994); 
Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between 
Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (1993). 
4. See generally E. WIGHT BAKKE, REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY: CHALLENGE AND 
TESTING IN JAPAN (1968); JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, FORCED To BE FREE: THE ARTIFICIAL 
REVOLUTION IN GERMANY AND JAPAN (1957); Robert B. Seidman, Law and Development: A 
General Model, 6 L. & Soc'YREv. 311, 312 (1972) ("After all, whatever American scholars 
may believe about the superiority of the legal system of Ruritania, one may doubt that the 
decision makers in Kenya will give a hoot."). 
5. Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human 
Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. 1. 1, 31 (1995) (quoting 
JOMO KENYATTA, FACING MT. KENYA 129 (1965)). 
6. See OCTAVIO PAZ, THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE: LIFE AND THOUGHT IN MEXICO 81-
88 (1961). 
7. See ELISABETH BUMILLER, MAY You BE THE MOTHER OF A HUNDRED SONS: A 
JOURNEY AMONG THE WOMEN OF INDIA 72 (1990). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (Admanatia Pol1is & Peter Schwab eds., 
1979); Katherine M. Culliton, Legal Remedies for Domestic Violence in Chile and the 
United States: Cultural Relativism, Myth, and Realities, 26 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 183 
(1994). 
8. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-traveling and Multi-cultural 
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 
(1991-92). As a Latina, I am particularly sensitive to the dangers of forced acculturation by 
a dominant group. See generally LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES (Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, 
ed., 1995). 
9. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
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movement has been dominated by feminists from the United States and 
other western feminists, but challenged by third world feminists for 
excluding or essentializing the perspectives and needs of women of color 
and third world women.lO The United Nations Fourth World Conference 
on Women held in Beijing illustrated the difficulty of communicating 
across cultural differences to articulate a common statement on women's 
rights. ll Western feminists now attempt to include women of color and 
women from other countries and cultures as part of their intellectual and 
activist movement. 12 Such inclusiveness can help white feminists see their 
own ethnocentricity and understand their privileged position compared to 
that of third world women and women of color. 13 
Just as inclusivity works to overcome narrow perspectives, using a 
range of theoretical perspectives helps to broaden comparative analysis. 
Liberal feminism teaches about the value of autonomy and independent 
moral agency.14 Radical feminism articulates the limits of liberalism and 
autonomy, especially for those women not in a position to exercise 
autonomous choice. 15 Cultural feminism instructs us about the possibilities 
of alternative women's values. 16 Post modem feminists and feminists of 
color teach us about the falsity of over-generalizing women's experiences, 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139; Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on 
the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Bonnie Thornton Dil, Race, 
Class, and Gender: Prospects for an All-Inclusive Sisterhood, 9 FEMINIST STUD. 131 
(1983). See also, 2 LATINOS IN THE UNTIED STATES: LATINA ISSUES (Antoinette Sedillo 
L6pez ed., 1995)[hereinafter LATINA ISSUES]. 
10. See, e.g., Valerie Amos & Pratibha Parmar, Challenging Imperial Feminism, 17 
FEMINIST REv. 3 (1984); CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY ET. AL., THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND 
THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM (1991). 
11. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, Forum on Women Agrees on Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 
1995, at AI. See also Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling 
the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REv. 49 (1993). 
12. See, e.g., ROBIN MORGAN, SISTERHOOD Is GLOBAL: THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S 
MOVEMENT ANTHOLOGY (1984); ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS & VICKI L. RUIZ, UNEQUAL SISTERS: 
A MULTI CULTURAL READER IN U.S. WOMEN'S HISTORY (1990); Martha I. Morgan & 
Monica Maria Alzate Buitrago, Constitution-Making In a Time of Cholera: Women and the 
1991 Columbian Constitution, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 353 (1992). 
13. See generally Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of 
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or other-
isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397; Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, On Privilege, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & 
L. 217 (1994). 
14. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. 
REv. 1163 (1988). 
15. See generally Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 
1279 (1987). 
16. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decision-making, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988); CAROL 
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY & WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 
(1982) . 
................................................ ------------... ~ 
.. __ .. ~~m~rnwmmw~~m~¥~·m __ m·=-________ ~ __________________________ __ 
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values and needs. 17 No single feminist approach appropriately draws 
cultural comparisons between women's legal status in different legal 
systems. 
It is important to evaluate the effect of laws on the quality of women's 
lives. Does the law open opportunities for women? Does it treat women 
fairly? What do women pursue? What are their needs and their dreams? 
In what ways does the law circumscribe women's lives? Does one's 
culture and legal system value autonomy? If so, are women in a position to 
exercise autonomous choice? If not, how do women feel about their 
position in society? How do feminists who belong to the culture prioritize 
and conceptualize their own agenda for social change? 
This Article will construct a feminist method of comparing women's 
legal status using insights from feminism and critical race theory. 18 It 
begins with a framework for evaluating the progress in improving women's 
lives and legal status in another country while being sensitive to that 
country's cultural values. The proposed comparative methodology 
involves three steps. First, the comparativist must look for and perceive 
cultural context. Cultural context can be discovered in a variety of ways, 
including traveling, reading, interviewing, listening, observing, and using 
ethnography and demographic interpretation (to name a few methods). 
Second, the comparativist must develop a framework for identifying the 
legal context e.g., identifying the status of the legal system as Civil, 
Common Law, Socialist, Islamic, etc. Third, the comparativist should use 
feminist and critical race theories to consider the implications of legal 
issues for women. The comparativist should seek women representing a 
particular culture and listen to their stories. 19 By using the proposed 
methodology, the comparativist will be able to draw meaningful 
comparisons and contrasts in legal status while recognizing cultural 
context. The proposed analysis helps comparativists broaden their 
perspective and minimize ethnocentricity and recognizes the importance of 
understanding how women view their own legal status and situation. 
Finally, this Article will discuss abortion law in Mexico and the United 
States to illustrate the comparative method proposed.20 
17. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative In Empathetic Learning: Post-Modernism and 
the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 287, 295-297 (1992). 
18. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Critical Race Feminism and International Human Rights 
of Women in Bosnia, Palestine, and South Africa: Issues for LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REv. 337 (1997). 
19. I think it is important that women of the culture be involved in defining for 
themselves what would constitute an improvement in their lives; thus, in my work about 
Mexican women, I have relied on interviews with Mexican women and on Mexican feminist 
writings whenever possible. 
20. See, e.g., Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, Two Legal Constructs of Motherhood: 
"Protective" Legislation in Mexico and the United States, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S 
STUD. 239 (1992) (comparing protective legislation in Mexico and the United States). 
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II. THE PERILS OF COMPARING: DECONSTRUCTING 
DIFFERENCES AND CONSTRUCTING FALSE DICHOTOMIES 
A growing body of literature compares laws affecting women.21 
However, the authors fail to understand differences in cultural values. 
Thus, the comparisons made are incomplete?2 A feminist comparativist 
must be open to the possibility that women in a culture might share the 
cultural values and be empowered by distinct cultural approaches to 
gender. 23 Although feminists are concerned with deconstructing patriarchal 
legal systems and social structures that disadvantage women, feminists 
must also be wary of imposing their own values on others. Ironically, such 
imposition of values is one of the very things feminists have resisted about 
patriarchy. It is important that a feminist who chooses to engage in 
comparative analysis learns to suspend judgment in analyzing differences. 
Differences should be viewed in their context and from a cultural 
perspective. This is not to say that feminists should not examine the ways 
in which women are disadvantaged in cultural systems; a universal truth is 
21. Notable comparative works on women's legal issues include: Paula C. Johnson, 
Danger in the Diaspora: Law, Culture and Violence Against Women of African Dissent in 
the United States and South Africa, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 471 (1998); Marsha A. 
Freeman, Measuring Equality: A Comparative Perspective on Women's Legal Capacity 
and Constitutional Rights in Five Commonwealth Countries, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 
110 (1990); Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understandings of Work, 
Parenthood and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 CAL. L. REv 531 (1993); 
Carol Rasnic, Germany's Legal Protection for Women Workers Vis a Vis Illegal 
Employment Discrimination in the United States: A Comparative Perspective in Light of 
Johnson Controls, 13 MICH J. INT'L L. 415 (1992); Nicolle R. Lipper, Sexual Harassment in 
the Workplace: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the United States, 13 COMPo 
LAB. L. J. 293 (1992); MARGARET E. LEAHY, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND THE STATUS 
OF WOMEN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF UNITED STATES MEXICO SOVIET UNION CUBA [sic] 
(1986); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); GISBERT 
H. FLANZ, COMPARATIVE WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE 
(1983). 
22. See Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist 
Legal Studies, and the Post Colonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 525 (criticizing the 
ethnocentric "gaze" of comparative law and discussing collaborative work as a way of 
avoiding ethnocentrism). 
23. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine Zuni, Domestic Violence and Tribal 
Protection of Indigenous Women in the United States, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv 69 (1995) 
(discussing the importance of respecting culture as opposed to western feminism in crafting 
legal solutions). Traditional Navajo culture is a matrilineal society. The Navajo creation 
story articulates major differences between men and women justifying different roles. In the 
story, Changing Woman explains the differences between men and women when she makes 
her demands on the sun: 
Remember that I willingly let you send your rays into my body. Remember 
that I gave birth to your son, enduring pain to bring him into the world. 
Remember that I gave that child growth and protected him from harm ... 
Remember, as different as we are, you and I, we are of one spirit. As 
dissimilar as we are, you and I, we are of equal worth. As unlike as you and I 
are, there must always be solidarity between the two of us .... 
PAUL G. ZOLBROD, DINE BAHANE: THE NAVAJO CREATION STORY 274-75 (1984). See also 
GARY WITHERSPOON, NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE (1975). 
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that women in most cultures are disadvantaged socially, politically, legally 
and educationally.24 However, the disadvantage will not be the same as 
that experienced by white, liberal, middle-class feminists in the United 
States. Rather, women's oppression may be linked to broader social, 
political and cultural issues. For example, American middle-class feminists 
may support policies aimed to keep wages low for women of color and 
those of the Third W orId. 25 
Thus, it is important that a comparativist be aware of social and 
cultural context. A major comparative work on family law and abortion is 
Mary Ann Glendon's Abortion and Divorce in Western LaW.26 In the book, 
Ms. Glendon surveys legal principles in European and North American 
countries. Unfortunately, the work fails to perceive the cultural context and 
women's role within that cultural context. After conceding that the legal 
'story' is not the whole 'story,'27 she proceeds to summarize and categorize 
the types of abortion laws and family laws in the nation states of Europe 
and North America.28 She alludes to a cultural context,29 but fails to 
include a description of the role of women in society and in creating social 
and cultural advances in women's rights. 3D For example, she glosses over 
the feminist litigation responsible for much of the transformation of the 
abortion law and family law in the United States and Europe.31 She places 
the judge-made and legislature-created legal "stories" in philosophical and 
theoretical constructs created by de Toqueville, Hobbes and John Stuart 
Mill in the United States, and by Rousseau and Kant in Europe.32 These 
philosophers had an important impact on liberal intellectual discourse. In 
particular, Mill and Rousseau created important intellectual foundation for 
feminist theory. However, it was the more textured changes wrought by 
feminist activists and their political will that resulted in the profound 
societal and legal transformation of women's legal status throughout both 
Europe and the United States.33 Glendon professes to be interested in the 
24. See, e.g., ROBIN MORGAN, SISTERHOOD Is GLOBAL: THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S 
MOVEMENT ANTHOLOGY (1984); Susan Faludi, Swedish Sojourn, Ms., Mar'/April 1996, at 
64 (chronicling problems of Swedish women politicians). 
25. See Evelyn Nakno Glenn, Cleaning Up/Kept Down: A Historical Perspective on 
Racial Equality, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335-36 (1991) (detailing a historical analysis of 
work experiences for women of color). 
26. GLENDON, supra note 21. 
27. Id. at 9. 
28. See id. at 145-154. 
29. See id. at 33-39. 
30. Glendon's book was also criticized for failing to recognize fundamental social and 
legal differences between West Germany and the United States. See Florian Miedel, Is West 
Germany's 1975 Abortion Decision a Solution to the American Abortion Debate? A 
Critique of Mary Ann Glendon and Donald Kommers, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
471 (1993-94). 
31. GLENDON, supra note 21. 
32. Id. at 112-34. 
33. See, e.g., CAROLINE DALEY & MELANIE NOLAN, SUFFRAGE & BEYOND: 
& idA! &1 
AM 
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educational function of the enactment of legal norms?4 Ironically, she 
ignores both the educational role of feminist consciousness raising, which 
resulted in an awareness of law as a source of women's oppression, and the 
cultural impact of that awareness. Her conclusion that a mediated approach 
like that of the European nations might satisfy the needs of both abortion 
advocates and opponents35 misses the points raised by women on both sides 
of the question and tells an incomplete story.36 A feminist comparative 
analysis should avoid such omissions. 
III. PROPOSED ANALYSIS 
The proposed analysis requires comparativists to first, perceive cultural 
context; second, identify context in legal norms; and third, use feminist 
theories and critical race theories to consider implications of legal regimes 
for women. The proposed analysis requires consideration of the not so 
obvious facts of women's lives. 
A. PERCEIVING CULTURAL CONTEXT 
As illustrated by Glendon's book, a major difficulty in comparative 
analysis is the perception of cultural context. Culture has been almost 
exclusively studied by white first world anthropologists who attempt to 
describe societies and social ways of doing things.37 The nature of culture 
can vary from subgroup to subgroup and even from individual to 
individual. 38 Culture is also affected by political development and stability 
as well as economic status. Unfortunately, the anthropologists' 
descriptions of culture may suffer from the distorted lenses that even the 
most trained anthropologist brings to the study of people who are 
different. 39 On the other hand, people have difficulty describing their own 
cultural norms-except as being different from other cultures. In other 
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (1994); JANET K. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF THE 
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONFLICT AND THE DECISION PROCESS (1979); ELEANOR 
FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE (1959); WILLIAM HENRY CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN 
(1972). 
34. GLENDON, supra note 21, at 9. 
35. See id. at 58-62. 
36. See Heleen F. P. Ietswaarrt, Incomplete Stories 69 B.U. L. REV. 257 (1989) (review 
of Glendon's Abortion and Divorce in Western Law and criticizing it for failing to perceive 
the social ramifications of abortion and divorce law). 
37. See RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 2 (1934) Anthropologist Ruth Benedict 
states: 
Id. 
No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a 
definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. Even in his 
philosophical probes he cannot go behind these stereotypes; his very 
concepts of the true and the false will still have references to his particular 
traditional customs. 
38. See id. at 1-20. 
39. See id. at 3-4. 
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words, culture is invisible to those who are within the culture. The 
interactions of people from different cultural backgrounds reveal the 
differences. Such interactions make people notice different values, beliefs 
and customs. Cross-cultural interaction makes the previously invisible 
visible. That is one of the reasons international travel is so valuable. Other 
sources of cultural context are critical readings of popular culture, history, 
literature, ethnography, interviews and personal experiences. In addition, a 
review of demographics and social and educational data enhances 
understanding. Comparative analysis that ignores social and cultural 
context risks painting an incomplete picture. 
B. IDENTIFYING CONTEXT IN LEGAL NORMS 
Of course, a comparativist must also perceive legal context. The 
development of legal systems is as varied as the number of systems that 
exist. Some systems evolved from cultural and political self-development; 
other legal systems were transplanted; some systems were borrowed, others 
were imposed.40 All legal regimes are fluid, changing in response to social, 
political, or cultural pressure. Further, the application and interpretation of 
legal norms varies with social contexts, political systems and cultural 
norms.41 It is possible that laws that look startlingly different on their face 
may be very similar in application. Other laws may look similar on the 
books but be applied quite differently. The context of the legal system as 
part of the civil law tradition or as part of the common law tradition will 
mean that the methods of enforcement and interpretation will be quite 
different. A cursory comparison might deconstruct differences that are not 
really there or create false dichotomies. For example, while Mexico's 
constitution looks like that of the United States, it is quite different in 
history, purpose and application.42 Thus, it is important to gain an 
understanding of the law's history, intended purpose and application in 
order to have a complete picture of the law. 
C. USING FEMINIST THEORIES TO CONSIDER IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN 
A feminist comparative analysis of laws affecting women should use 
critical race and feminist insights to help draw comparisons in women's 
legal status and to understand the implications for women. These insights 
will help identify subtle issues confronting women in the cultures studied. 
40. See RICHARD A. DANNER & MARIE-LoUISE H. BERNAL, INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN 
LEGAL SYSTEMS, 48-51 (1994); RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL 
SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 75-93 (1985). 
41. See generally HERBERT J. LIEBESNY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1981). 
42. See Rubens Medina, The Mexican Legal System, in INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 83-87 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise H. Bernal eds., 1994). 
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1) Feminist Theories 
Feminists have developed a variety of theoretical frameworks for 
addressing women's rights. Most of the litigation and scholarly analysis in 
the United States has sought to remove sex-based stereotypes from the law. 
This has occurred under the rhetoric of equality as espoused by liberal 
feminists.43 These feminists argue against stereotypes about women and 
against prohibitions on their employment. 44 In sum, they advocate that 
women be treated equally to men.45 They deny the possibility of 
differences between men and women that might justify different treatment 
or classification. 46 As Deborah Rhode described, "arguments emphasizing 
sexual difference, even those designed to advance feminist causes, risked 
contributing to the stereotypes on which antifeminism [sic] rested.,,47 In 
essence, middle-class feminists perceived the employment, political, and 
social privileges accorded men and sought those privileges. They wanted 
equal treatment. 
However, other feminists use a more relational approach. They believe 
that there are some instances in which women are different. For example, 
during pregnancy women are obviously different from men. These 
feminists argue that under those circumstances women should be treated 
differently in order to achieve substantive equality.48 Since many feminists 
have fought hard to erase generalizations based on perceived differences 
between men and women, early feminists did not accept this 'new' 
approach wholeheartedly.49 
Professor Patricia Cain has classified the various writers of 
contemporary U.S. legal feminist thought into four main categories: liberal 
feminism, radical feminism, cultural feminism and postmodern feminism. 50 
Liberal feminists believe that the legal system should treat women as 
autonomous, independent rights-bearing individuals Gust like men).51 The 
quest for equal treatment has been criticized because in some situations 
43. See generally CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980). 
44. Seeid at 362-417. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 
1168 (1998) quoted in Henna Hill Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology, Feminism, and the 
Law, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 75 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 
1990). 
48. I have argued in a different context that this is the difference between equality in 
treatment and equality in achieving results. See Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, Educating our 
Children "On Equal Terms": The Failure of The De lurelDe Facto Analysis in 
Desegregation Cases, 7 CHICANO L. REv. 1, 18-24 (1984). 
49. See, e.g., . Deborah L. Rhode, Definitions of Difference, in THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 209-12 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990). 
50. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 829-
41 (1990). 
51. See id. at 829. 
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men and women are not equal. According to liberal feminism, treating 
men and women as equals results in women losing ground in rights and 
privileges previously afforded to women.52 
Radical feminists stress women's subordination as a class, not as 
individuals.53 Catharine MacKinnon,54 Andrea Dworkin55 and Christine 
Littleton56 have all written that the law should recognize gender 
differences. They cite pregnancy, nursing, abortion, rape, domestic 
violence and pornography as instances where women are not the 'same' as 
men. They maintain that the law should take women's differences into 
account to achieve fairness and to help them achieve equality. 
Cultural feminists, like radical feminists, focus on women's differences 
from men, but they believe that the law should value women's special 
nurturing orientation.57 Divorce and custody law are examples in which 
women's differences should be recognized positively. 58 Cultural feminists 
have relied on works such as Gilligan's theory of women's different 'voice' 
to support their theories.59 
Postmodern feminists and women of color do not believe in an 
'essential' quality of woman; they seek to discover the diverse realities of 
women's experiences.60 For example, women of color, poor women and 
lesbian women, have experiences that are different from the 'essential 
characteristics' of the abstract woman described in previous schools of 
feminism. Minority and poor women have always faced the challenge of 
working to survive and caring for their children. Their experiences in the 
workplace and the political realm are different from those of middle-class 
white women.61 
All of these theories are useful in considering the implications of laws 
affecting women. We learn about the positive aspects of autonomy, but 
also its limitations. These theories teach us about the value and uniqueness 
of women's experiences and how to respect and appreciate the diversity of 
women's experiences. My own view is that feminist insights reveal 
male/female complexities. However, they do not present a coherent theory 
52. See Littleton, supra note 15, at 1304-14. 
53. See Cain, supra note 50, at 832. 
54. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW (1987). 
55. See ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT WING WOMEN (1978). 
56. See Littleton, supra note 15. 
57. See Cain, supra note 50, at 835-38. 
58. See Martha Finemen, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decision-making, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 768-70 (1988); Leslie 
Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic 
of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1,46-47 (1990). 
59. See Cain, supra note 50, at 836. 
60. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). See also Cain, supra note 50, at 838-41. 
61. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 17. 
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for addressing those complexities. This failure stems from the fact that 
feminist thought is in its infancy. While we, as feminists, have learned to 
deconstruct and criticize patriarchy, we have not convincingly created an 
alternative view. Comparative analysis can help us learn about other 
cultures and become more sophisticated in developing a coherent 
alternative philosophy. 
2) Finding "Herstories" in Cultural History 
Since many texts about nation states do not include an analysis of the 
contributions and experiences of women, it is very important to make sure 
that any comparative analysis of women's rights seeks out women's role in 
cultural history. Robin Morgan's anthology, Sisterhood is Global,62 is a 
collection of material about women in seventy countries and the United 
Nations. The "Herstory" section of each nation's material outlines 
women's history. That is, it describes women's work in developing a social 
and political agenda concerning women's issues.63 A feminist comparative 
analysis should seek to uncover women's history in the cultures studied. 
Only by uncovering these stories does a comparativist begin to understand 
the relationships between women's history, culture and law. The history of 
women in each country reveals a great deal about women's power and role 
in the country. It is vital to an understanding of legal context. 
3) Listening to Women Across Culture: Gathering the Accounts 
Any analysis of rights affecting a particular group needs to consider the 
perspectives of the members of that group. The members are in the best 
position to evaluate how the law affects them. Thus, it is important to 
understand how women perceive their own legal status. Interviewing 
women of a culture and reviewing their writing is important to identify the 
unconscious imposition of ethnocentric values. It also serves to gather the 
accounts of the actual experiences of women. This investigation will help 
the comparativist understand the relevance and significance of the laws 
studied. It will help the comparativist gain insights that may not have been 
obvious. 
IV. APPLYING THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS: ABORTION IN 
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 
A. PERCEIVING CONTEXT: SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT 
The United States and Mexico have vastly uneven economic resources. 
62. SISTERHOOD Is GLOBAL: THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT ANTHOLOGY 
(Robin Morgan ed., 1984). 
63. See id. See also Pamela Bridgewater, Connectedness and Closeted Questions: The 
Use of History in Developing Feminist Legal Theory, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 351 (1997) 
(stressing the importance of historical analysis in feminist legal theory). 
358 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2 
However, since 1940 Mexico has steadily grown (albeit unevenly) 
economically. Post-war development has been pronounced in the 
manufacturing sector. 64 Agricultural development under the "green 
revolution" has been channeled in the capital intensive production of export 
crops such as cotton and coffee at the expense of subsistence crops that 
have traditionally supported farm workers. The population has grown from 
19.7 million in 1940,65 to an estimated 73 million in 1982, to about 97.6 
million in 1997.66 The population of Mexico is projected to be more than 
100 million by the year 2000.67 Demographic movement depicts a pattern 
of migration from rural areas to the cities.68 Massive urban growth has put 
a burden on the poor. Housing is grossly inadequate to meet the needs of 
the poor. This social and demographic context explains potential priorities 
for a women's agenda in Mexico. It is predictable that women in Mexico 
will be concerned with social and economic justice for the poor rather than 
more middle-class concerns. Conditions in Mexico are in sharp contrast to 
those in the United States, the most wealthy and powerful country in the 
world. 
B. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN V ALVES 
One source for perceiving cultural context is through popular culture. 
The popular Mexican film, Like Water for Chocoiate,69 has been subtitled 
in English and screened in an edited version in art theaters throughout the 
United States. It is based on the best selling novel by Laura Esquibel. 70 She 
tells the story of a family living near the United States/Mexican border in 
turn-of-the-century Mexico. In the family, there was a tradition71 that 
dictated that the youngest daughter could not marry, but rather had to 
remain at home to care for her mother. Tita, the youngest daughter in the 
family, fell in love with a handsome young man named Pedro. Her mother 
did not permit her to marry him, but instead arranged for Tita's older sister, 
Rosaura, to marry Pedro. He agreed to marry the older sister in order to be 
near Tita. He moved in with the family, thus setting up the sexual tension, 
repression and rage that bubble within the household. 
At one point, Tita suffered a breakdown; an American doctor nurses 
her back to the vibrant and vivacious woman she had been before the 
64. See MERILEE S. GRINDLE, PROGRAM IN UNITED STATES-MEXICAN STUDIES, OFFICIAL 
INTERPRETATIONS OF RURAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT: MEXICO IN THE 1970's, at 1 (1981). 
65. HOWARD F. CLINE, MEXICO: REVOLUTION TO EVOLUTION, 1940-1960, at 83 (1963). 
66. THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DEMOGRAPHICS (visited 
March 17, 1999) <http://www.usmcoc.org/eco5.html>. 
67. See MEXICO: A COUNTRY GUIDE XIX, at x-xi (Tom Barry ed., 1992). 
68. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: INVESTING IN HEALTH, WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 299 (1993). 
69. LIKE WATER FOR CHOCOLATE (Miramax 1991). 
70. LAURA ESQUIBEL, LIKE WATER FOR CHOCOLATE (Carol Christensen & Thomas 
Christensen trans., 1992). 
71. The tradition was a family tradition, not a Mexican cultural tradition. 
" 
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breakdown. The American physician fell in love with Tita and asked her to 
marry him. At first she agreed, but ultimately decided not to marry him in 
order to engage in an illicit affair with her first love, her brother-in-law. 
The movie also involves the magical nature of Tita's cooking. The 
wedding cake Tita baked for her sister's wedding caused the guests to 
become affected by great waves of melancholy; they remembered lost 
loves, and became ill with pain and nausea. Her quail in rose petal sauce 
produced sexual desire and longing in everyone who partook of it. The 
mix of magic, passion and beauty is compelling. 
I had the unique opportunity of seeing the film in Mexico at the height 
of its popular run, and then about a year later seeing the shortened version72 
that ran in the United States. I saw it with Mexican feminists in Mexico 
and American feminists and men in the United States. Mexicans loved the 
stunning photography, the fine acting and the actors' sensuality. Mexican 
feminists were interested in the portrayal of passion from a woman's 
perspective. They discussed the triangular conflict between mother, 
daughter and sister. They were intrigued by the symbolism in the use of 
cooking and the kitchen. They discussed the sexual repression and the 
family rage. In the United States, Americans with whom I discussed the 
film also enjoyed its beauty and other aspects. But, while they accepted the 
film's magical moments as characteristic of Latin American literature, 73 
some found the plot wholly unbelievable. Several of my friends could not 
understand how Tita could acquiesce to her mother's wishes. In other 
words, some of my American friends could not understand how Tita could 
put her family ahead of her own wishes. Others did not understand how an 
intelligent woman could reject the security of a marriage with the American 
doctor. They could not see how an intelligent, beautiful and vibrant 
woman could make the 'irrational' choice of rejecting a solid, well-to-do 
physician in order to pursue a doomed love affair with her sister's 
ineffectual husband. The different reactions I was exposed to illustrate 
some differences in perspectives between Mexican culture and Anglo -
American culture. 
Devotion to family has traditionally been a very important cultural 
value in Mexican society. Individuals often sacrifice their needs for the 
needs of their family.74 While it is not exactly a Mexican cultural trait to 
put passion before security in matters of marriage, the American view that 
marriage to the doctor would have been the more 'rational' choice, 
72. The shortened version omitted the story of Chencha, the family maid. 
73. See, e.g., GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE (Gregory 
Rabassa, trans., 1970); ISABEL ALLENDE, THE HOUSE OF THE SPIRITS (Magda Bogin trans., 
1986). 
74. See generally OSCAR LEWIS, THE CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ (1961); OSCAR LEWIS, FIVE 
FAMILIES: MEXICAN CASE STUDIES IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY (1959); ALAN RIDING, 
DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS (1984); PATRICK OSTER, THE 
MEXICANS: A PERSONAL PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE (1989). 
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illustrates a value of American culture. While both countries have 
experienced profound societal changes wrought by economics, technology 
and education, the cultural values of the citizens of each country have 
remained different from one another: the United States has developed a 
strong value in individualism and autonomy; Mexico has retained a strong 
tradition and value of the family.75 It is important to keep these differences 
in mind when comparing and contrasting these two countries as values 
underlie legal systems. 
Another important difference between Mexico and the United States 
surfaced one evening as I was working on this project. My son asked me 
for help with his homework. His 'culturally sensitive' task was to pretend 
to be either a pilgrim or an Indian and to write about early American life 
from that perspective. He asked me why he had to pick one or the other. I 
realized that in Mexico a child would probably not be asked to pick one 
perspective. Mexican people today view themselves as the descendants of 
both the Spanish colonizers and the native peoples. Their heritage 
embraces both perspectives. In the United States, the legacy is not mixed 
despite the increasing incidence of interracial union.76 There is an Indian 
perspective, and there is a Euro-American perspective.77 
Paradoxically, because the Mexican mestiz078 heritage and its Catholic 
heritage is so pervasive,79 there is much more of a consensus on cultural 
norms - especially about the family unit. 80 It is easier to establish a shared 
vision of society in Mexico. Mexican law can reflect these norms. 
Because the United States consists of such a variety of cultural, ethnic and 
racial groups, it is more difficult to establish cultural norms and 
expectations. Lawmakers are faced with the dilemma of setting up legal 
norms that respect and permit differences. The differences are mediated by 
permitting a large degree of individualism and autonomy. 
C. PERCEIVING LEGAL CONTEXT 
On the surface, Mexico's legal system seems much like that of the 
75. See Sedillo L6pez, supra note 20, at 253. 
76. See Adrienne Poke, One Chicago Couple's Experience, 41 Interrace (1999); Glenda 
Valentine, Introduction to GIGI KAESAR (PHOTOS) & PEGGY GILLESPIE (INTERVIEWS), OF 
MANY COLORS: PORTRAITS OF MULTIRACIAL FAMILIES xi, xi-xiv (1997). 
77. These two groups were at war with each other and ultimately the Europeans prevailed 
to dominate the government, the economic and the social landscape of this country. See 
ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE LANCE AND THE SHIELD: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SITTING BULL 
(1993). 
78. See ENRIQUE KRAUSE, MEXICO: BIOGRAPHY OF POWER 55-59 (1997). 
79. See id. at 68-85. See generally AGUSTiN BASAVE BENITEz, MEXICO MESTIZO: 
ANALISIS DEL NACIONALISMO MEXICANO EN TORNO A LA MESTIZOFILIA DE ANDRES MOLINA 
ENRIQUEZ ).[MEXICO MESTIZO: ANALYSIS OF MEXICAN NATIONALISM DURING THE 
MESTIZOFILIA OF ANDRES MOUN A ENRIQUEZ] (1992). 
80. See Sedillo L6pez, supra note 20, at 253. See generally JORGE SANCHEZ AzCONA, 
FAMILIA Y SOCIEDAD [FAMILY AND SOCIETY] (1980). 
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United States. Mexico's constitution, especially the provisions of the 1917 
constitution that survive from the 1824 and 1857 constitutions, was 
modeled, in many respects, on that of the United States. Mexico has a 
Senate and a House of Representatives, a Supreme Court, circuit courts, 
district courts, the appearance of checks and balances, a federal system and 
a state system of jurisdiction.81 Although much was modeled on North 
American legal forms, Mexico did not adopt the English common law, but 
instead continued with the Roman and European ci vii law tradition.82 
The civil law tradition largely operates without juries. Judges rely on 
the written code to render decisions. 83 They do not engage in a search for 
judicial interpretation of a statute to resolve ambiguities. For example, a 
Mexican district court is not bound by a previous Supreme Court 
interpretation of a statute unless the Supreme Court has created binding 
precedent by ruling the same way in five consecutive cases. Although this 
is changing, Mexican lawyers do not often cite cases in their legal briefs. If 
they cite anything other than the code, they tend to cite a treatise or other 
writing by a legal scholar.84 The power of the judiciary in Mexico is 
limited as compared to the power of the judiciary in the United States. 
Judges do not have the power to declare statutes unconstitutional and thus 
void. If a litigant has a claim based on the deprivation of a right guaranteed 
by the constitution, the litigant may use the amparo process.85 However, 
this proceeding is binding only on the litigants before the court. A statute, 
even if found by the judge to be inconsistent with the constitution, stays on 
the books and is enforced until the legislature changes it. Rulings such as 
the Roe v. Wade decision86 are not possible under the Mexican system. In 
practical effect, the judiciary has been accused of acting as a rubber stamp 
for the policies and legislation of the powerful executive branch.87 
81.See MEX. CONST. art. II §1; art. II §2; art. III §1; art. III §2[1-3]; art. III §3; art. III §4; 
art. v. 
82. See generally HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS, GoVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN LATIN 
AMERICA 345-47(1958). 
83. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 34-47 (1985). 
84. See Woodfin L. Battle, Stare Decisis, Doctrine, and Jurisprudence in Mexico and 
Elsewhere, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED 
JURISDICTIONS 311,325 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974). 
85. See RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO 
SUIT (1971). 
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
87. Interviews with Mexican lawyers who prefer to remain anonymous (1994) (Case 
notes on file with author). Mexican law is western in the sense that it derives from many of 
the same European origins as those of the United States. It shares much in common with the 
United States; as stated earlier, some of its legal frameworks were patterned after U.S. laws. 
However, in studying Mexican law there is a danger of focusing on false cognates or similar 
structures and importing the same meaning to each. For example, the terms "jurisprudence" 
and "jurisprudencia" are false cognates. In the United States jurisprudence means legal 
philosophy, legal reasoning, legal thought. In Mexico jurisprudencia refers to the situation 
where the Mexican Supreme Court has decided a case the same way more than five times. 
"Jurisprudencia" thus does not have the same meaning as "jurisprudence" and should not be 
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Meaningful comparisons between laws of the two countries, and 
especially those laws affecting women, also require an understanding of the 
distinctions between legal and social phenomena. In Mexico, it is often 
said that there is a huge gap between "el derecho y el hecho" the law and 
the deed. That is, laws may envision a set of consequences flowing from a 
law, but the citizens may experience those consequences quite differently. 
Law Professor Alicia Elena Perez, of the Universidad Nacional Autonoma 
de Mexico (UNAM), believes that since the Spanish colonization of 
Mexico began in the 1500s, it has been inherent in Mexico's culture to 
have a deep distrust of government and the judicial process.88 She believes 
that feminists in Mexico share this distrust. 89 Thus, women have not used 
the judicial process of amparo to challenge obviously discriminatory laws 
that are inconsistent with the constitutional equal rights amendment. In 
contrast, resorting to the courts has been a powerful method for feminists 
challenging gender discriminatory laws in the United States.90 
D. MODERN MEXICAN FEMINISM 
In Mexico, there seem to be many more feminist activists than feminist 
academics. The academics write about women in literature-some focus 
on reproductive rights, others on feminist and social theory.91 Maria 
Antonieta Rascon, a Mexican feminist, has pointed out that women's 
traditional roles are important to replicate a class-based society, in that they 
reproduce and work in the labor force at little or no cost-such unpaid 
labor (both reproductive and economic) allows Mexican society to maintain 
the status quO.92 FEM, the leading feminist magazine, is filled with 
powerfully written critiques of government, political articles, poetry and 
prose. In 1989, UNAM published a collection of essays written by a 
leading feminist, Lourdes Arizpe. These essays document an emerging 
feminist voice challenging Mexican legal, cultural and societal treatment of 
women. 93 
used in a translation of the term. A student of Mexican law must avoid interpreting 
Mexican law using Anglo American understanding and values. It is important to understand 
definitional and legal subtleties because they may have profound implications upon how the 
law actually affects people's lives. See Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, Translating Legal Terms 
in Context, 17 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 2, on file 
with author). 
88. See Interview with Alicia Elena Perez Duarte y Noria (Summer 1994) (on file with 
author). 
89. See id. 
90. See Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave-Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect 
Social Change in the 1990s?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1252, 1253 n.2 (1993). 
91. See, e.g., MARIA ANGELES REBOLLAR DE LOYOLA, MEXICANAS AL GRITO DE GUERRA 
[MEXICAN WOMEN AT THE BRINK OF WAR] (1975). 
92. See Maria Antonieta Rascon, La Mujer y la Lucha Social [Woman and the Social 
Cause], in IMAGEN Y REALIDAD DE LA MUJER 139, 141-43 (Elena Urrutia ed., 1987). 
93. See LOURDES ARIZPE, LA MUJER EN EL DESARROLLO DE MEXICO Y DE AMERICAN 
LATINA [WOMEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICO AND LATIN AMERICA] (1989). 
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In comparison, the Mexican activists work in rape crisis centers and 
actively organize demonstrations. Urban poor women have fought to 
improve their lives and the lives of their children. Community based 
female activists have pursued change. Some have used interesting 
strategies.94 Learning about their mutual concerns of inadequate services, 
inflation, alcoholism and family violence, women band together to petition 
the government and stage state demonstrations. However, in their public 
and political work, women often present their demands as a struggle to 
fulfill their traditional family role as the mother. For example, in 
Guadalajara, women have protested chronic water shortages by bathing 
their children in the ornamental fountain in front of city hall. In doing so, 
they chastised state officials for choosing to allocate water for a public 
fountain over providing water for basic human needs.95 These women did 
not challenge the culturally traditional gender roles. Rather, they viewed 
themselves as being forced to take public and political action in order to 
fulfill their traditional roles. Another example of women taking public 
communitarian action was their involvement in rebuilding Mexico City and 
in providing food and shelter to those stranded after the Mexico City 
earthquake of September 1985.96 These political and community activities 
are, in a sense, transforming the role of mother to include activism in order 
to further their maternal impUlses. Their objective of improving their daily 
lives and the quality of lives of their children does not rely on asking to be 
treated 'equally.' They seek to change the values of government and to 
place their needs on the governmental agenda.97 
This approach is consistent with Mexican cultural support for the 
family, and thus is more likely to be accepted by society. It also values a 
feminine perspective on achieving structural change that can transform 
society. Mexican feminists seek improvement for their communities rather 
than enhancement of individual rights. They thus look for opportunities to 
create new societal norms that value community and human needs.98 
Although some Latin American feminists have drawn parallels between 
authoritarian governments and families,99 in Mexico there does not seem to 
be a unified feminist movement seeking to change the traditional family 
roles. This is true despite the fact that women's work outside the home 
94. See KATHLEEN LOGAN, HACIENDO PUEBLO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GUADALAJARAN 
SUBURB 78-82 (1984). 
95. See id. at 79-80. 
96. See PARTICIPACI6N SOCIAL, RECONSTRUCCI6N Y MUlER. EL SISMO DE 1985 [SOCIAL 
PARTICIPATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND WOMEN. THE QUAKE OF 1985] (Alejandra Massolo 
& Martha Schteingart eds., 1987). 
97. See MARTHA ROBLES ET. AL., CECILIA SOTO: EL PODER DE LA NUEVA FuERZA 
POLfTICA [CECILIA SOTO: POWER AND THE NEW POLmCAL FORCE] (1994). 
98. See id. 
99. See Sandra McGee Deutsch, Feminist Studies, in LATINAS OF THE AMERICAS: A 
SOURCEBOOK, 129, 136-39 (K. Lynn Stoner ed., 1988). 
364 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2 
serves to change traditional gender role allocation. 1°O In meeting the 
challenge of economic survival, many Mexican women do not seek 
'individual rights' for women, but instead seek basic improvement in the 
quality of life for all. 101 
E. COMPARING ABORTION LAW IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 
The laws on abortion in the United States and Mexico are completely 
different. Generally, Mexico prohibits abortion while the United States 
permits it. 102 The Mexican conceptual approach focuses on morality, the 
sanctity of the family and new life.103 The conceptual approach in the 
United States focuses on an individual's right to autonomy in decision-
making. Mexico's constitution provides that all families have the right to 
control the number and spacing of their children.104 North Americans who 
are accustomed to thinking about individual rights and autonomy tend to 
think of this as a guaranteed constitutional right to family planning. 
However, in Mexico, abortion is not considered a method of family 
planning because from the moment a child is conceived, the child comes 
under the protection of the law, having the same protection as one who is 
born. lOS Mexican states generally permit abortion and make it available to 
women only in cases of rape106 or to protect women's health. 107 The vast 
majority of Mexican citizens are Catholic-retaining the religion brought 
by the Spanish colonizers. 108 Their belief in the teaching of the church 
affects their positions on abortion.109 
In 1990, there was an attempt to liberalize the abortion laws in the state 
100. See ElOIse Norman, La Organizacion de la Vida Familiar. [sic] Un Estudio de Cso: 
La Candelaria, Coyoacan [The Organization of Daily Life. A Study of cso: La 
Candelaria, Coyoacan], in NUEVOS TEXTOS Y RENOV ADOS PRETEXTOS (1994). 
101. See generally CLARA EUGENIA ARANDA ET. AL., LA MUJER: EXPLOTACI6N, LUCHA, 
LIBERACI6N [WOMAN: EXPLOITATION, STRUGGLE, LIBERATION] (1976). 
102. See Christine Tierney, PAN Candidate's Agenda Worries Mexican Feminists, Reuters 
North American Wire, August 12, 1994, available in LEXIS-NEXIS Library, Reuters File 
(reporting that abortion is illegal, however also available). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
103. See supra note 74; EUGENIO TRUEBA OLIVARES, EL HOMBRE, LA MORAL Y EL 
DERECHO [MAN, MORALITY AND LAW] 275-81 (1986). 
104. MEX. CONST. art. IV. For a bibliography on family planning, see MONSERATI LINES, 
LIBRE ELECCI6N 0 FECUNDIDAD CONTROLADA [FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND CONTROLLED 
REPRODUCTION] (1989). 
105. See C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal [C.C.D.F.] art. 167. 
106. The theory for allowing an abortion in the case of rape is that the raped woman did 
not consent to the creation of a family. See Interview with Pedro Vasquez Nieto, Attorney 
(Spring 1992) (on file with author). Of course, this theory is inconsistent with Catholic 
teachings about abortion. See Pope John Paul II, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in 
Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 11, 1987, at A14. 
107. See C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal [C.C.D.F.] art. 22. 
108. See GEORGE W. GRAYSON, THE CHURCH IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 1-2 (The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, Significant Issues Series, 1992). 
109. See id. 
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of Chiapas. 110 The Chiapas story illustrates the power of the federal 
executive and the problems feminists have in Mexico. According to Alicia 
Perez, the federal family planning authorities approached the executive 
about considering abortion as a method of family planning. This would 
probably have had a dramatic effect on population control; if abortions 
were considered as a method of family planning, they could be performed 
free or at very low cost in well run and plentiful government clinics. III 
Officials wanted to see if the people of Mexico would accept this drastic 
change from previous policy before announcing it as federal policy. They 
then persuaded the Chiapas legislators to amend the criminal law in 
Chiapas and decrimininalize abortion. The Chiapas legislature responded 
with the usual accommodation of requests from the federal executive and 
made the desired changes. Upon publicizing the changes, the government 
discovered extreme opposition and intense national debate on the issue. 
Liberalization of abortion law was widely criticized as immoral and 
destructive of the family.1I2 
Mexican feminists, while clearly not the impetus for the change, felt 
obligated to support it since reproductive rights had been on their agenda 
for some time. 113 However, many feminists had private reservations about 
the change, because they feared that if abortions became legal, overly-
aggressive government clinics might engage in forced abortions in the 
same manner in which they had performed unconsented sterilizations.114 
The national debate became so intense that the Chiapas legislature revoked 
their legalization of abortion. 1I5 New regulations of family planning do not 
include abortion as a method of family planning. 116 
11O.See State of Chiapas Backs Down From Attempt To Decriminalize Abortion, 
SourceMex, Jan. 16, 1991 (on file with author). 
111. See New Injectable Contraceptive to be Introduced in Mexico, Reuters North 
American Wire, June 6, 1991, available in LEXIS-NEXIS Library, Reuters File (plans to 
introduce cyclophem in free clinics in Mexico). 
112. See Perez, supra note 88. Dilation involves stretching or enlarging an organ or body 
part and curettage is a surgical scraping. See also Interview: Mexican Women and 
Reproductive Rights, SOURCEMEX, May 6, 1992 (interviewing Latina feminist Selina 
Espinoza) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview]. 
113. See Perez, supra note 88. 
114. See, e.g., Sara Lovera, Sterilization Pushed Without Women's Consent, InterPress 
Service, March 16, 1989, available in LEXIS-NEXIS, Academic Universe, InterPress 
Service File (citing a study by the College of Mexico which denounced the abusive way in 
which women were sterilized in public hospitals and clinics: describes the plight of Dulce 
Maria Gonzalez who was sterilized without her consent in a government hospital at the age 
of 22; and women's groups mounting 1984 protests against the sterilization of women 
against their will or without their informed consent.); Mexico "Forcibly Sterilizing" Poor 
Women Group, Reuters North American Wire, Oct. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS-NEXIS 
Library, Reuters File. 
115. See Interview, supra note 112. 
116. See JORGE MARTINEZ MANAUTOU, SUCEDI6 EN MEXICO: DEL NACIMENTO DE LA 
"PILDORA" A LA REDUCCI6N DE LA T ASA DE CRECIMIENTO POBLACIONAL [IT HAPPENED IN 
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On a side note, it is reported that some of the most vigorous opponents 
of legalization are gynecologists who are rumored to perform clean, skilled, 
but illegal abortions, disguised as dilation and curettage, for hefty fees. 117 
Finally, abortion laws in Mexico are not vigorously enforced. 118 Many 
illegal abortions are performed throughout Mexico. 119 Numerous women 
suffer complications from botched illegal abortions. A report from a public 
hospital in Durango indicated that in 1990, twelve hundred women 
received medical care after suffering complications from botched 
abortions. l2O This was a 153 percent increase over 1989.121 In practice, 
abortion is available to women with the funds to pay for it. Most of these 
women travel to a different state and pay a gynecologist to perform their 
dilation and curettage for a large fee. 122 
In contrast, the United States slowly moved to legalize abortion in 
various states until the famous case of Roe v. Wade 123 legalized abortion, 
for any reason, during the first trimester of pregnancy. In the context of 
reproductive rights, individual rights have been perceived as a sphere of 
autonomy in which the individual has the right to exercise choices about 
familial relationships.124 Building on earlier cases giving individuals the 
right to use contraception without state interference,125 Roe v. Wade 
focused on an individual woman's autonomy and her right to choose 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.126 The Court limited states' 
ability to legislate in this area. A woman has the right to make this 
decision without the consent of her husband. 127 However, subsequent cases 
about this right have ensured that it is not available to poor women,128 and 
there is often a waiting period, and minors often need parental consent. 129 
Although the government generally will not pay for or counsel about 
abortions,130 abortions are available to middle-class women without "undue 
GROWTH] (1994). 
117. See Perez, supra note 88. 
118. See EL PROBLEMA DEL ABORTO EN MEXICO [THE ABORTION PROBLEM IN MEXICO] 107 
(Luisa Maria Leal ed., 1980) (describing statistics in Mexico regarding abortions performed); 
ROSARIO CARDICH, VISIONES DEL ABORTO [VISIONS OF ABORTION] (1993) (interviews of 50 
Mexican women who have had abortions). 
119. See ARANDA, supra note 102, at 165. 
120. Complications from Botched Abortions in Durango: One Hundred Fifty-Three 
Percent Increase Over 1989. SOURCEMEX, January 16, 1991 (on file with author). 
121. See id. 
122. Interview with Mexican female professional who prefers anonymity (June 1994) (on 
file with author). 
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
124. See Planned Parenthood of Southern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992). 
125. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
126. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
127. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. U. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-70 (1976). 
128. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980). 
129. See Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979). 
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burdens" by the state. 13 1 Reproductive rights are seen as an aspect of 
individual autonomy. The issue of abortion has proven to be extremely 
controversial. 132 United States family planning policy is complicated by 
abortion politics. Feminists in the United States have found that the 
autonomy, rights-based approach to abortion has limitations. I33 Laurie 
Schrage has pointed out that the abortion debate in the United States has 
polarized women on both sides of the debate. She states that women on 
both sides of the abortion debate in the United States have a different view 
of motherhood. 134 Pro-choice women see the demands of motherhood as 
unreasonable, unfair and sometimes unmanageable if a woman is not ready 
for motherhood. 135 For pro-life women, motherhood is an essential aspect 
of a woman's existence. I36 When a woman marries or has sex she 
implicitly agrees to take on this role. 137 The demands of motherhood are 
seen as reasonable and fair if she has the proper atlitude.138 The rhetoric 
about 'women's right to choose' or 'pro-life' obscures these perspectives. 
Religious convictions play an important role in values concerning the 
morality of abortion. In addition to the theoretical and religious differences 
between pro-choice and pro-life advocates, the abortion issues have 
become part of the political discourse.139 In my view, this reflects deeply 
held views about women's self-perception as mothers and potential 
mothers. 
Despite the difference in abortion theory and politics, abortions are 
available to middle-class women with money to pay for the procedure in 
both the United States and Mexico. Poor women in both countries do not 
have access to the procedure. I40 Given the different economic stituations of 
both countries, more women in the United States have access to the 
procedure. Also, because of the religious aspects, Mexican women are 
more reluctant to choose an abortion. The implications of the above 
comparative analysis are complex. Mexican and Mexican American 
131. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989). 
132. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (Brian 
Barry & Samuel Popkin eds., 1984); UNDERSTANDING THE NEW POLITICS OF ABORTION 
(Malcolm L. Goggin ed., 1993). 
133. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 262 (1991-92). See, e.g. 
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 PENN. L. REv. 955,968-98 (1984). 
See also New Mexico Right to ChooselNARAL v. Johnson, No. 23, 239, 1998 WL 959993 
(N.M. Nov. 25, 1998) (women used New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment to challenge 
state rOegulations limiting funding for abortions). 
134. See LAURIE SHRAGE, MORAL DILEMMAS OF FEMINISM: PROSTITUTION, ADULTERY, 
AND ABORTION 60 (1994). 
135. See id. at 62. 
136. See id. at 63. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. See Seigel, supra note 134. 
140. See id. 
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women in the United States find themselves caught in a clash of cultural 
and legal norms. 141 Allowing absolute individual autonomy (as in the 
United States) can help women in a position to exercise choices to make 
those choices. However, autonomy theory does not help women (e.g., 
women of color and those who are poor) who are not in a position to 
exercise choices. There are also real questions about how much 'choice' 
women really have in a patriarchal society where expectations about 
women's proper roles limit women's opportunities. Feminist successes in 
the United States seek to further individual choice. However, individual 
choice evades the morality questions, or at least leaves them up to the 
individual. In contrast, laws in Mexico support traditional cultural gender 
roles and religious moral values. 142 The different approaches to abortion 
reveal a great deal about autonomy as a value held in the United States, 
and those family and religious values held in Mexico.143 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thus, a contextualized comparative analysis of women's rights reveals 
that the abortion issue is conceptualized differently in Mexico and the 
United States. Context helps comparativists studying women's rights draw 
meaningful comparisons and contrasts in legal status while recognizing 
culture. The proposed methodology helps broaden perspective and 
minimize ethnocentricity. The methodology draws on feminist insights to 
evaluate implications of the law for women. Finally, it recognizes the 
importance of understanding how women perceive their own legal status in 
their own cultural context. There is much comparative work to be done; 
the proposed methodology promotes consideration about this work's 
implications and the complexities of gender dynamics. 
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